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Practice and Procedure Under the
Illinois Human Rights Act
by Richard J. Puchalski*
The Illinois Human Rights Act,1 effective July 1, 1980, was enacted under the state's police power to prevent unlawful discrimination in the areas of employment, real estate and rental transactions, and access to financial credit and public accommodations.
The Human Rights Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) replaced a number of separate state agencies and amended or repealed other legislation dealing with civil rights within Illinois.?
The new Act also simplified and strengthened enforcement procedures in the area of discrimination As well as codifying and centralizing procedures, the Act established new agencies to enforce
the law and created a bifurcated system of enforcement and administration. The Illinois Department of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Department) was created to investigate and
* J.D. John Marshall School of Law, 1970. Partner, Doss, Puchalski, Keenan
& Bargiel, Ltd. Special Assistant for Attorney General of Illinois, 1974. Mr.
Puchalski is presently General Counsel of the Illinois Human Rights Commission.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to 9-102 (1981).
2. The agencies that have been supplanted are the Fair Employment Practices Commission, the Illinois Commission on Human Relations and the Illinois
Department of Equal Opportunity. The statutes which have been amended in order to comport with the Human Rights Act include: An Act to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment under Public Contracts, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, § 17 (1981);
the Real Estate Brokers and.Salesmen Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5732 (1981);
and An Act Concerning Issuance and Use of Credit Cards, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17,
§ 6002 (1981).
The repealed legislation included: the Fair Employment Practices Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-867 (1979); the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 65-21 to 65-31 (1971); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 881-887 (1967); the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 63b71-63b90 (1979); the
Human Relations Commission Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 214.1-214.5(a)
(1951); the Act Concerning the Leasing of Dwellings, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, §§ 3738 (1909); the Fairness in Lending Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, § 801-807 (1980).
3. Prior to the implementation of the Human Rights Act, there had been
some criticism with regard to the effectiveness of prior civil rights laws in Illinois.
See Gertz, The Unrealized Expectations of Article I, Section 17, 11 J. MAR. J.
PRAC. & PROC. 283 (1978); Minsky, FEPC in Illinois: Four Stormy Years, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 152 (1965). See also Note, The Illinois Fair Employment- Practices Act, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 267.
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conciliate charges that are filed by complainants with the agency,
to prepare and file complaints with the Human Rights Commission
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission), and to seek temporary
relief and enforcement of Commission orders and decisions. The
Commission performs adjudicatory functions. Among its duties,
the Commission approves settlements, reviews dismissals of

charges and renders decisions involving claims of discrimination."
Given the number of changes, both substantive and procedural,
under the Act, the purpose of this article is to acquaint the practitioner with the procedural aspects of handling a discrimination
case, before both the Department of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Commission.

The Act declares that it is the public policy of the State of

Illinois: (a) to secure for all individuals freedom from unlawful discrimination; (b) to maintain the personal dignity of all people in
Illinois; (c) to implement certain state constitutional guarantees;
(d) to promote equal opportunity and affirmative action; and (e) to
protect citizens against unfounded charges of unlawful discrimination.' The Act is considered to be remedial legislation which
should be liberally construed to effect its purposes. 7 It prohibits
discrimination against a person because of his or her race, color,

religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, handicap

4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-101 (1981). The workload of the Department of
Human Rights and its predecessor, the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, has increased dramatically over the years. For example, from 1962 to
1964, 569 charges were filed with the FEPC, and 12 of these cases proceeded to a
contested hearing. Minsky, supra note 3, at 156 n. 18. In the fiscal year ending
1979, 2,343 charges were filed with the FEPC. During the first year of its existence, the Department of Human Rights processed 2,367 charges; the Human
Rights Commission rendered 750 decisions involving settlements, requests for review, motions, orders and decisions. ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS & ILL. HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM'N, FIRST ANNUAL REPORTS (1981).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-102(G) (1981). The Commission, with offices in
Chicago and Springfield, consists of nine members appointed by the Governor. No
more than five members may be affiliated with the same political party. One Commission member is designated the Chairperson. The day-to-day activities of the
Commission are managed by an Executive Assistant.
In deciding cases arising under the Act, the Commission functions as an appellate tribunal, reviewing determinations of the Department as to settlements
and dismissals, and reviewing the orders and decisions of the Administrative Law
Judge Division.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-102 (1981).
7. See Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. 508 v. Human Rights
Comm'n, 88 Ill. 2d 22, 24, 429 N.E.2d 1207, 1209 (1981).
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or unfavorable discharge from the military services.8 By adding
marital status and age as protected classifications, the Act expands
the protections previously available under prior legislation.
Since the Human Rights Act is of rather recent origin, there
are relatively few judicial decisions to serve as precedents. However, since much of the Human Rights Act is essentially a reenactment of prior legislation,9 judicial decisions construing the Fair
Employment Practices Act (FEPA) will be of precedential value. 10
Although many of the cases discussed in this article arose under
the FEPA, they are of great significance in construing the Human
Rights Act. In addition to the precedents of the reviewing courts in
Illinois, a number of other authorities are relied upon by the Commission and the Department in the enforcement of the Act. The
Illinois courts have held that federal decisions which interpret
analogous federal civil rights legislation are both helpful and relevant, although not binding when deciding cases under Illinois
8. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(Q) (1981). Most of the protected classifications are defined in the Act. Age means "the chronological age of a person who is
40 but not yet 70 years old." § 1-103(A). Handicap is defined as "a determinable
physical or mental characteristic of a person, including, but not limited to, a determinable physical characteristic which necessitates the person's use of a guide
or hearing dog, the history of such characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic by the person complained against, which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth or functional disorder and which characteristic:
(1) ...

is unrelated to the person's ability to perform the duties of a

(2) ...

is unrelated to the person's ability to acquire, rent or main-

particular job or position;

tain a housing accommodation;
(3) .

.

. is unrelated to a person's ability to repay;

(4) ... is unrelated to a person's ability to utilize and benefit from a
place of public accommodation." § 1-103(I).
Marital Status is defined as "the legal status of being married, single, separated,
divorced or widowed." § 1-103(J). National Origin is defined as "the place where a
person or one of his or her ancestors was born." § 1-103(K). Religion means "any
belief protected by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution." § 1-103(N). Sex is defined as "the status of being male or
female." § 1-103(0). Race, color and ancestry are not defined in the Act.
9. Much of the language and terminology of the Fair Employment Practices
Act is incorporated into the Human Rights Act. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§
851-867 (1979).
10. If previously construed terms are used in an amended statute, it is generally concluded that the legislature intended to adopt the prior construction given
to those terms. Hupp v. Gray, 73 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 382 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (1978). See
also 1A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.35 (1972).
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law. 1 Given the similarities between federal and Illinois civil rights
legislation, the Illinois reviewing courts have not hesitated to rely
upon relevant federal case law. 2 However, as the court in Board of
Governors of State Colleges & Universities v. Rothbardt" recently
noted, federal case law is not binding, but only persuasive. Thus, it
is possible that the Illinois courts may refuse to follow analogous
federal decisions in the area of discrimination law, but to date this
has not happened.
In line with its statutory mandate, the Commission has also
designated certain of its decisions as precedents to be both published and followed in subsequent cases before the Commission."
In addition, the state's predecessor agency in the area of employment discrimination, the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, has also published decisions that are often relied on by
the Commission and Department." Counsel practicing before the
Department and the Commission should utilize these decisions,
whenever appropriate. Both agencies have also promulgated rules
and regulations covering the substantive as well as the procedural
aspects of the Act."
I.

THE CHARGING PROCESS

A case is usually commenced under the Human Rights Act in
any of the four areas of jurisdiction with the filing of a charge" by
11. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 49
Ill. App. 3d 796, 365 N.E.2d 535 (1977); City of Cairo v. Fair Employment Prac-

tices Comm'n, 21 Ill. App. 3d 358, 315 N.E.2d 344 (1974).
12. See, e.g., Florsheim Shoe Co. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Comm'n, 99 Ill. App. 3d 868, 425 N.E.2d 1219 (1981); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 49 Ill. App. 3d 796, 365 N.E.2d 535 (1977);

City of Cairo v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 21 Ill. App. 3d 358, 315
N.E.2d 344 (1974).
13. 98 Ill. App. 3d 423, 424 N.E.2d 742 (1981).
14. Section 8-102 of the Act requires that the Commission publish its decisions to assure a consistent source of precedent. The Commission's decisions are
designated as either precedential decisions or as non-precedential decisions. Pres-

ently, five volumes of these decisions have been published.
15. The reported decisions of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission are contained in five volumes.
16. See Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human Rights (1980),
and Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission (1981).
17. A charge is defined under the Act as an "allegation filed with the Department by an aggrieved party or initiated by the Department under its authority."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(C) (1981). The areas of jurisdiction under the Act
deal with employment (article 2), real estate transactions (article 3), financial
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a person or persons aggrieved. The Department may also file a
charge of discrimination under its own initiatory powers."8 A
charge must be filed with the Department within 180 days after
the civil rights violation has been committed. 9 This time period
has been held to be jurisdictional, and charges filed beyond the
prescribed 180 days are subject to dismissal.2 0
The charge is filed on a form provided by the Department, is
affirmed before a notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths,"' and must be of sufficient detail to substantially
advise any party as to the facts surrounding the alleged civil rights
violation.2 Also, the charge should contain the following information: (a) the full name and address of the complainant and respondent; (b) a statement of the facts alleged to constitute the violation, including the date, time, and place of the violation; (c) a
statement describing any other action instituted by or on behalf of
the complainant arising out of the incidents alleged in the charge."3
It is important that the charge set forth all the allegations as
to the alleged discriminatory conduct, since the Commission has
held that in the event a complaint is issued, it cannot contain new
or additional claims of discrimination not related to the allegations
contained in the charge. The Commission has also held that the
purpose of the charging requirement is to give to the Department
and the parties an opportunity to conciliate and attempt to settle
the matter prior to formal action.2 5 Given this purpose, the complaint cannot create new claims of discrimination not specified in
the initial charge. However, a charge can be amended to cure any
credit (article 4) and public accommodations (article 5). The procedure before the

Department and Commission is essentially the same in all four instances.
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-101(B) (1981).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102(A) (1981).
20. See Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univ. v. Rothbardt, 98 Ill.
App. 3d 423, 424 N.E.2d 742 (1981); Zabrowski and U.S. Steel Corp., 2 Ill. HRC
Rep. 75 (1981).

21. Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human Rights § 3.2 (1980).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102(A)(2) (1981).

23. Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human Rights § 3.3 (1980).
24. Zabrowski and U.S. Steel Corp., 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 75 (1981). In this case,
the complainant alleged in her charge that her employer retaliated against her for
filing a prior charge with the FEPC. The complaint that was filed alleged that the
respondent committed sex discrimination when it failed to promote the complainant. Since the complaint alleged an entirely new cause of action, it was dismissed.

25. Id. at 87. See also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Plummer v.

Chicago Journeyman Plumbers, 452 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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technical defects, to clarify or amplify allegations, or to set forth

additional facts related to the subject matter contained in the original charge.26 The amendment relates back to the date that the
charge was originally filed.
Upon filing, each charge is docketed, assigned a case number

and served on the respondent within ten days of filing.27 Unless the
complainant requests otherwise, all charges are dually filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, if the charge
states a cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.2

One of the most difficult questions the Commission deals with
relating to charges is determining when the 180-day filing period
begins to run. The crucial question usually centers around whether
the violation is continuing in nature so as to extend the 180-day
filing period in the Act. The continuing violation theory has been
restricted under federal law by the United States Supreme Court
in United Air Lines v. Evans 9 and Delaware State College v.

26. Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human Rights § 3.6 (1980).
This procedure is consistent with federal law. See Sanchez v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Morris v. City of Pittsburgh, 445 F. Supp. 981 (W.D. Pa.
1978).
27. Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human Rights § 4.1 (1980).
28. Id. § 3.5(c). Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 2000e-15
(1969).
29. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). In Evans, the plaintiff was forced to resign her position as a flight attendant with United Airlines. Four years later, in 1972, Ms. Evans was rehired as a new employee by United. After she was denied her request to
receive her pre-1972 seniority, she filed a complaint in federal court alleging a
continuing violation under Title VII. The district court dismissed the complaint,
holding that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred. The Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court's ruling. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.
1976). The United States Supreme Court in turn reversed the Seventh Circuit,
stating that the plaintiff did not allege facts which established a violation subsequent to her rehiring in 1972:
Respondent emphasizes the fact that she has alleged a continuing
violation. United's seniority system does indeed have a continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits. But the emphasis should not be
placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present
violation exists. She has not alleged that the system discriminates against
former employees who were discharged for a discriminatory reason any
differently than former employees who resigned or were discharged for a
non-discriminatory reason. In short, the system is neutral in its
operation.
431 U.S. at 558.

[1982:75]

ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

Ricks.30
Since the Evans decision, the issue has become whether the
continuing violation theory, as set forth in that case, is to be narrowly or broadly construed."' The Evans rationale, that mere continuity of employment does not prolong a cause of action for discrimination, was re-affirmed by the United States Supreme Court
32
in Delaware State College v. Ricks.
The rationale of Evans and Ricks was approved and adopted
by an Illinois appellate court in Board of Governors v. Rothbardt3
In facts very similar to Ricks, the Rothbardt court held that the
date upon which the 180-day filing period commenced was the date
when the plaintiff was made aware that her contract was terminal,
not the date that her employment ended. The court went on to
hold that merely because the decision maker continues to study
the rationale of its previous ruling does not alter the date upon
which the discriminatory act took place.34
The Human Rights Commission has followed the rationale of
Evans, Ricks and Rothbardt in discharge and tenure cases and in
situations where the alleged discriminatory act was a final, completed "one-time" violation. For instance, in Rank and Board of
30. 449 U.S. 250 (1980). For a general discussion of the continuing violation
theory in light of Evans and Ricks, see Carty, The Continuing Violation Theory
of Title VII After United Air Lines v. Evans, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 929 (1980); Jacobs, Ricks v. Delaware State College: An End to Continuing Violations, 7 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 85 (1981); and Note, Title VII and the Continuing Violation Theory, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 894 (1979).
31. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in an interpretive
memorandum, interprets Evans to hold that only discharges are not considered to
be continuing violations. 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 5029 (July 12, 1977). The
federal courts, on the other hand, have accorded a much broader application to
the Evans decision. See Farris v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978);
Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064 (2nd Cir. 1977); Freude v. Bell
Tel. Co. of Pa., 438 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Rogers v. Berger, 438 F. Supp.
713 (D.C. Mass. 1977).
32. 449 U.S. at 257. Ricks was a college professor who was denied academic
tenure and as a result brought an action under Title VII claiming national origin
discrimination. The Court once again rejected a "continuing violation" claim and
held that the limitations period commenced when the decision not to grant tenure
was communicated to Mr. Ricks, as opposed to when his term of employment
ended. Id. at 259. The Court reasoned that the date when the discrimination occurred is fixed despite the fact that one of the effects of the tenure denial, i.e., the
eventual loss of employment, took place at a much later date.
33. 98 Ill. App. 3d 423, 424 N.E.2d 742 (1981).
34. Id. at 429, 424 N.E.2d at 747.
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Governors of State Colleges & Universities,3 5 a salary adjustment
which was made approximately five years before the charge was
filed was not considered to be a continuing violation.
However, the Commission has limited the application of Evans and its progeny in other instances and has found continuing
violations under certain circumstances. Relying upon an instructive federal court decision,"' the Commission, in reversing a dismissal by the Department for lack of jurisdiction, examined the continuing violation theory in Evans and World Color Press,3 7 and set
forth three different instances in which allegations of continuing
violations have been asserted.," The first situation is typified by
Ricks and Rothbardt, where the concern is not so much with continuity of impact as with assessing when the aggrieved individual
should have been alerted to the fact that a discriminatory act was
occurring. In the second instance, the complaint challenges a series
of events, all of which are alleged to have been discriminatory, but
only one of which occurred within the relevant time period. As
long as the most recent act occurs within the filing period, no "continuing violation" question really exists because the most recent
event supports jurisdiction. 8s In the third instance, the complaining employee alleges that the employer has engaged in a continuous, institutionalized pattern and practice of discrimination. A
challenge to systematic discrimination is held timely if brought by
a present employee because the system deters the employee from
seeking his full employment rights or threatens to adversely affect
the employee in the future.4 0 This three-pronged approach will
probably be followed by the Commission in determining the timeli35. 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 30 (1981).
36. Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp., 79 F.R.D. 580 (D.C. Minn. 1978). The Elliott opinion points out that the determination of whether or not a charge is timely
is not often easy, since many employment practices cannot be viewed as separate
and discrete incidents occurring at a specific point in time. Id. at 584. The analy-

sis used by the court in Elliott and adopted by the Commission breaks down the
concept of a continuing violation into categories which are more discernible. See
also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 860-942 (1976);
2 A. LARSEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 48.54 (1981).
37. 5 Ill. HRC Rep. 190 (1982).
38. Id. at 194.
39. See Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 49 Ill. App. 3d
796, 365 N.E.2d 535 (1st Dist. 1977).

40. See, e.g., Rick v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1975).
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83

ness of charges and whether the violation can be considered continuing in nature.
Once a charge is filed, the investigation-conciliation process of
the Department goes into effect."' Upon filing, the Department
conducts a full investigation into the facts alleged in the charge.
Both the Human Rights Act and the rules of the Department and
Commission provide for the issuance of administrative subpoenas
to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents during the investigation stage; 42 The courts have given the
predecessor Fair Employment Practices Commission wide latitude
in the enforcement of administrative subpoenas. For example, an
Illinois appellate court held, in Fair Employment Practices Commission v. Hohe," that the FEPC need not make any showing of
probable cause that discrimination had occurred before issuing an
administrative subpoena. Thus, a subpoena of the Commission will
be entitled to enforcement if the information sought is relevant to
the inquiry and the demand is reasonable." The Department normally does not need to resort to compulsory process in order to
investigate any given charge since most respondents cooperate with
the Department's investigation and conciliation efforts. The Commission has held that in cases where the respondent does not produce documentation normally kept in the ordinary course of its
business, an "adverse inference" may be drawn. 4
As a part of its investigation, the Department, at its discretion, may hold a fact-finding conference within 120 days after the
charge is filed. The purpose of such a conference is to give the Department the opportunity to gather facts and promote settlement
or other resolution of the charge. 4 ' There is no right to a verbatim
See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102 (1981).
42. Id. §§ 7-102(C)(2), 8-102(F). See also Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human Rights § 4.3 (1980).
43. 53 Ill. App. 3d 724, 368 N.E.2d 709 (1977).
44. Id. at 730-31, 368 N.E.2d at 711. This holding is consistent with the judicial deference usually accorded administrative subpoenas. See Scott v. Association
for Childbirth At Home Int'l, 88 Ill. 2d 279, 430 N.E.2d 1012 (1981); Illinois
Crime Investigating Comm'n v. Buccieri, 36 Ill. 2d 556, 224 N.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967).
HRC Relp. 252 (1981). The "adverse
45. Moore and Laborers Local 100, 2 I11.
inference rule" was adopted from P.R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 956, 959
(7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969). To date this inference has been
applied only in cases involving determinations as to whether or not substantial
evidence exists to support a charge.
46. Board of Educ. of Hawthorne School Dist. No. 17 v. Eckmann, 103 Ill.
41.
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record or transcript at this stage of the proceeding. The fact-finding conference has been held to be investigatory and non-adjudicatory in nature, and as such the denial of a court reporter at the
investigative stage does not constitute a denial of a respondent's
procedural due process rights. 47 Fact-finding conferences were at
one time mandatory,' but with the advent of the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment
Practices Commission,' the Fair Employment Practices Act was
amended to make the convening of such conferences within the
discretion of the agency. Under the Human Rights Act, the decision to hold a fact-finding conference is likewise committed to the
Department's discretion." If such a conference is held, it must be
within 120 days after the filing of a charge.
Although the Act has since been modified, the Zimmerman
Brush decision is of great significance." The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the legislative direction to convene a fact-finding
conference within 120 days was mandatory in nature.52 Failure of
the FEPC to convene the conference as mandated divested the
FEPC of its jurisdiction. In reaching this decision, the court relied
heavily upon its earlier opinions in Springfield-Sangamon County
Regional Plan Commission v. Illinois FairEmployment Practices
App. 3d 1127, 432 N.E.2d 298 (1982).
47. Id. at 1134, 432 N.E.2d at 304.
48. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 48, § 858(b) (1979), repealed by Human Rights Act,

P.A. 81-1216, § 11-101, effective July 1, 1980.

49. 82 Ill. 2d 99, 411 N.E.2d 277 (1980). This decision was later reversed by
the United States Supreme Court in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422 (1982). For a discussion of this reversal, see infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102(C)(3) (1981).
51. In that case, the plaintiff, Laverne Logan, was discharged by his em-

ployer, the Zimmerman Brush Company, on November 9, 1979. Five days later,
Logan filed a charge with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission alleging that he was discriminated against because of his physical handicap in that

he was terminated because his left leg was shorter than his right leg. The filing of
Logan's charge triggered the Commission's statutory obligation under the Act
then in effect to convene a fact-finding conference within 120 days. See supra

note 48. The fact-finding cohference was held five days after this statutorily mandated time period elapsed. The company appeared before the FEPC and moved
to dismiss the charge since the conference was convened beyond the 120-day time
period. When its motion to dismiss was denied, the company filed a writ of prohibition in the Illinois Supreme Court.

52. Zimmerman Brush, 82 Ill. 2d at 103, 411 N.E.2d at 280.
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Commission" and Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission,5 4 which

held that the FEPC lacked jurisdiction to proceed when complaints were not filed within the statutory time period. The factfinding conference was considered by the Zimmerman court to give
the parties "an opportunity to discuss and possibly settle the dispute without formal action being taken against the employer by
the Commission."" The court concluded that the fact-finding conference was a mandatory part of the complaint process which was
necessary in order for the FEPC to make an informed determination as to the merits of the charge. The constitutional arguments
raised by Logan regarding dismissal of his charge were rejected by
the Illinois Supreme Court in one paragraph. 6 In the view of the
Illinois Supreme Court, the time periods contained in the Act are
to be strictly construed even to the extent that an individual's
claim may be abrogated through no fault of his own.
However, the United States Supreme Court did not treat Logan's constitutional arguments in the same manner.5 7 In an opinion
authored by Justice Blackmun, six members of the Court concluded that Mr. Logan was deprived of a protected property interest in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 8 The Supreme Court began its analysis by making a twopart inquiry: 59 (1) whether Logan was deprived of a protected
property interest, and (2) if there was such a deprivation, what
process was due him? The Court answered the first question affirmatively by relying on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
53. 71 Ill. 2d 61, 373 N.E.2d 1307 (1978).
54. 78 Ill. 2d 143, 399 N.E.2d 590 (1979). For a discussion of these two decisions, see infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.

55. 82 Ill. 2d at 105, 411 N.E.2d at 281.
56. The court stated:
We also are not persuaded by the employee's protests that his rights
to due process and equal protection were violated. The statutory scheme
here was to provide, through administrative and judicial channels, a
means of relief from discriminatory employment practices. The legislature could establish reasonable procedures to be followed upon a charge,
and the observance of them here did not violate his constitutional rights.
2d at 108, 411 N.E.2d at 282.
82 Ill.

57. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Justice Blackmun also authored a separate

opinion holding that dismissal of Logan's claim violated the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Id.
59. 455 U.S. at 428.
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Trust" wherein it was held a cause of action was a species of property protected by the due process clause. The Court saw no difference between the cause of action at issue in Mullane and Logan's
right to sue for discrimination under the Fair Employment Practices Act. 1 The Court disagreed with the rationale of the Illinois
Supreme Court which held that since Logan's claim was statutorily
created, the legislature could establish certain procedures which
could extinguish that right.2 According to the United States Supreme Court, such a holding would in essence enable a state to
destroy at will virtually any legislatively created property interest.
A state may confer or take away rights via the legislative process,
but a state cannot otherwise deprive an individual of his property
without some appropriate procedural due process safeguards."
Since Logan did in fact have a property interest in his discrimination claim, the Court next turned to the question of what
process he should have been accorded." The Court reasoned that
the owner of a property interest should have the opportunity to
present his claim of entitlement before his rights are extinguished.
The timing and nature of this opportunity to be heard depends
upon the following factors: the appropriate accommodation of the
competing interests involved;"5 the importance of the property interest and the finality of the deprivation;" the likelihood of governmental error;61 and the magnitude of the governmental interests involved." The application of the above factors to Logan's
discrimination claim compelled the Court to conclude that Logan
was entitled to have the Commission decide his claim on the merits despite the failure of the state agency to hold the mandated
fact-finding conference. 9
The Court rejected the argument that a post-deprivation hearing would have been adequate to protect Logan's rights, since the
only remedy available in such an instance would have been an ac60. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).

61. 455 U.S. at 429.

62. Id. at 432.
63. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 575 (1979); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1960).
64. 455 U.S. at 432.
65. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
66. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
67. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
68. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-63 (1974).
69. 455 U.S. at 432.
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tion against the State of Illinois under the Court of Claims Act.7
The Court reasoned that this process would be lengthy, speculative
and could not provide for the reinstatement of Logan to his job nor
vindicate his right to be free from discriminatory treatment. The
significance of Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. lies not so much
with its application to the fact-finding procedures, since the Act
now provides that such proceedings are purely discretionary, but in
its application to the complaint process discussed later in this
article. 2
Once the Department schedules a fact-finding conference, the
73
failure of a party to attend can result in dismissal or default. If a

notice of dismissal or default is issued by the Department, the affected party may file a request for review within thirty (30) days of
the receipt of the notice of dismissal or default. 74 Fact-finding conferences can, however, be continued by agreement of the parties
and the Department. In such instances, the Department usually
requires that the parties waive the 120-day limitations period.
After the Department has completed its investigation and
fact-finding, a report is prepared by the staff investigator assigned
to the case. 7 ' These reports are considered confidential and are not
subject to disclosure prior to the Department's determinations.
Based upon the findings and conclusions contained in the investigative report, a determination is made as to whether substantial
evidence exists to support the charge. If the Department determines that substantial evidence exists, the parties are notified and
conciliation is
an attempt is made to settle the matter. If further
7
complaint.
a
issues
to no avail, the Department
If the Department determines that substantial evidence is
lacking, the charge is dismissed. The complainant is notified of the
dismissal and is advised of the right to seek review of the dismissal
before the Human Rights Commission. The complainant has thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the dismissal to file his request for
70. ILL.

REV. STAT.

71. 455 U.S. at 434.

ch. 37, § 439.8 (1981).

72. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102(C)(3) (1981).
74. Id.

75. Id. § 7-102(D).

76. Id. § 7-102(D)(2)(b). Rules and Regulations of the Department of Human
Rights § 4.6(c).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102(F) (1981).
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review and thus trigger Commission review.78 Upon receipt of the

request for review, the matter is assigned to a three-member panel
of the Commission. The panel then considers the administrative
record along with any additional evidence submitted by the charging party in the request for review. After consideration of this evidence, the Commission either affirms the dismissal, vacates the
dismissal, remands the matter for additional information or refers
the case to the Chief Administrative Law Judge for a hearing as to
any factual issues in dispute.79
As set forth in the Act, a charge must be supported by substantial evidence, or it is subject to dismissals ° Even though this
term is not defined under the Act, the Commission has held that
"substantial evidence" means relevant evidence that a
reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."1 Substantial evidence has been considered by the Commission also to be
less than a preponderance (which is the standard that the complainant must meet in order to prevail at a hearing on the merits),
but more than a mere scintilla of evidence.82 The same standard
was approved by one appellate court with regard to findings of
substantial evidence under the Fair Employment Practices Act."
It is thus safe to say that the substantial evidence test utilized by
the Commission will meet with judicial approval, given the wide
range of deference accorded by the courts with regard to substantial evidence determinations under prior legislation. 8 ' The appropriate scope of judicial review of dismissals for lack of substantial
evidence is to determine whether the agency's decision is arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion." The circuit courts, on review,
have thus affirmed most dismissals for lack of substantial evidence.
78. Id. § 7-102(D)(2)(a).

79. Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 4.7 (1981).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102(D)(2)(a) (1981).
81. Phillips and Dep't of Registration and Educ., 1 111. HRC Rep. 209 (1981);
Szymbroski and U.S. Steel, 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 214 (1982). This definition was borrowed from previous federal court decisions. See Consolidated Edison Co. v.

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1977).

82. Brinson and General Foods Corp., 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 214 (1981).
83. Chambers v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 96 Ill. App. 3d 884,
442 N.E.2d 130 (1981).
84. Klein v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 31 111. App. 3d 473, 334

N.E.2d 370 (1975).
85. Id. at 483, 334 N.E.2d at 377; Smaidris and Atlantic Richfield Co., 5 Ill.
HRC Rep. 204 (1982). See also Genuine Parts Co. v. F.T.C., 445 F.2d 1382, 1388
(5th Cir. 1971).

[1982:75]

ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

One of the frequent problems encountered by the Commission
is the participatory rights of the parties in the proceedings culminating in a determination of substantial evidence or a lack thereof.
The rights of participation by the complainant or the respondent
are limited because determinations of substantial evidence are considered to be investigatory rather than adjudicatory proceedings.
Active participation by either party would have the effect of turning every substantial evidence determination into a trial on the
merits. During the investigatory proceedings leading up to a substantial evidence determination, both sides are allowed input.
However, there is no right to discovery, cross-examination or confrontation as in adjudicatory proceedings.8 6 Once a charge is dismissed for lack of substantial evidence, the complainant has a
of judicial
right to seek review before the Commission and a right
87
dismissal.
the
affirm
review should the Commission
The respondent has no right to participate in request for review proceedings once a charge has been dismissed. 8 This approach has been a source of concern for respondents since the inception of the Act and has engendered some criticism." However,
the statutory scheme of the Human Rights Act clearly indicates
that the Department's determination of reasonable cause and the
nature of its investigation are purely discretionary. This limited
right of participation is entirely appropriate given the investigative
nature of the substantial evidence finding.90 Even if the Commis86. Klein, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 482, 334 N.E.2d at 377; Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420 (1960).

87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68 §§ 7-102(D)(2)(a), 8-103, 8-111 (1981).

88. Section 4.2 of the Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission provides:
Section 4.2 Notice by Commission-The Commission shall notify
the Department and other parties to the charge of the filing of a timely
request for review. Notice to the Department shall be accompanied by a
copy of the request. Only the Department and the party requesting review shall participate in any proceedings under this Article.
(Emphasis supplied.)

89. See Davis & Murphey, The Human Rights Act: Revision of Illinois Law

Concerning Discriminationin Employment, 69 ILL. B.J. 218, 219 n. 12 (1980).
90. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univ. v. Human Rights
Comm'n, 190 Ill. App. 3d 946, 441 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1982); Nerio and Ipsen Indus.,

5 Ill. HRC Rep. 199 (1982); Smaidris and Atlantic Richfield Co., 5 111. HRC Rep.

204 (1982). The Commission's position is in accord with federal law construing a
similar standard under Title VII. See United States v. Iron Workers Local No. 1,
438 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1971); Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.
1979); EEOC v. General Elec. Corp., 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
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sion vacates dismissal, the respondent's rights are not jeopardized
since there is still an opportunity for settlement or defense on the
merits at a public hearing.
Oral argument before the Commission in request for review
proceedings is not permitted. The Commission's determination to
either sustain, vacate or remand for further information is based
only upon the administrative record. In reviewing the decision to
dismiss the charge, the Commission resolves all doubts in favor of
the complainant.91 In practice, the great majority of the dismissals
that are reviewed by the Commission are affirmed." If a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction is vacated, the case is remanded to the Department either for a determination as to whether substantial evidence exists to support the charge or for the issuance of a complaint. In the event that a dismissal for lack of substantial
evidence is vacated, the matter is likewise remanded to the Department and a complaint is usually issued.
One of the fundamental purposes of the Act is the conciliation
and settlement of claims of discrimination. A settlement can be
entered into at any stage of the proceedings under the Act. Settlements are reduced to a written agreement (usually prepared by the
Department), signed by all parties, and submitted to the Commission for approval." In the event that a settlement agreement is
said to have been violated, the Department files a notification with
the Commission. The Commission can then order the Department
to seek judicial enforcement of the settlement" or order that a
hearing be held as to any factual issues regarding the alleged
violation."
The Act also provides that a charge may be dismissed if the
complainant refuses to accept a settlement offer that eliminates
the effects of the civil rights violation and prevents its repetition."
91. See Smith and Honeywell Motor Prod., 2 111. HRC Rep. 209 (1981); Peterson and Hart Carter Co., 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 235 (1981).
92. Approximately 90% of the dismissals that are reviewed by the Commission are affirmed. In fiscal year 1981, the Commission affirmed 88.5% of the Department's dismissals and vacated 11.5%. ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS & ILL.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, FIRST ANNUAL REPORTS (1981).
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-103(B) (1981). The overwhelming majority of
settlements are approved by the Commission. In fiscal year 1981, 99.7% of the
settlements were approved. ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS & ILL. HUMAN RIGHTS
COMM'N, FIRST ANNUAL REPORTS (1981).
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-111(B) (1981).
95. Id. § 8-105(B).
96. Id. § 7-103(D)(1), (2).
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This issue becomes very difficult to resolve since it involves the
balancing of the state's need to conciliate cases against the complainant's right to obtain the full relief that is due. 97 The Commission has held that the settlement provisions of the Act only guarantee the employer the opportunity to settle a charge prior to the
issuance of a formal complaint.9" The Act does not mandate the
degree or intensity of conciliation efforts undertaken by the Department or the parties. Thus, a dismissal by the administrative
law judge because the Department failed to properly conciliate was
reversed by the Commission. 9
II.

PLEADINGS

Once it is determined that substantial evidence exists to support a charge of discrimination and there has been a failure to
reach a settlement on the matter, a complaint is prepared by the
Department and filed with the Commission.'"0 After a complaint is
issued, the charging party is essentially on his own. The Department does not represent the complainant in any proceedings
0 This has been a common misconception
before the Commission."'
97. The recent Commission decision in Russell and United Parcel Serv. is an

example of the difficult questions which can arise under this section of the Act.
After investigating the charge, the Department entered a finding of substantial
evidence. During ensuing conciliation negotiations, respondent made a settlement
offer of twelve thousand dollars ($12,000.00) and a commitment to provide to
Russell a neutral reference to any prospective employers. Complainant declined to
accept this offer. Thereafter, the Department concluded that the respondent's offer encompassed full relief under Section 7-103(D) of the Act and that the complainant unreasonably declined to accept this offer. Complainant's charge was
then dismissed. The Commission vacated the dismissal, finding that the sum of
money offered to complainant did not provide him with his pension benefits since
he had worked for respondent approximately 24 years and the settlement offer
could not be considered to provide full relief. 4 Ill. HRC Rep. 220 (1982).
98. Blaylock and ATI, Inc., 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 27, 31 (1981).
99. Id. On remand, the complainant prevailed. 7 Ill. HRC Rep. 13 (1982).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102(F) (1981).
101. The Department can, however, seek temporary relief in the appropriate
circuit court to prohibit the respondent from doing or causing any act that would
jeopardize any relief or order which the Commission may ultimately grant. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-104(A)(1). In Prince and Board of Trustees, the complainants alleged that they were being dismissed pursuant to the respondent's
mandatory retirement policy which constituted impermissible age discrimination.
The Department moved for temporary injunctive relief in the circuit court pending a full determination by the Commission, which found in favor of the complainants. 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 1 (1980). The decision was eventually upheld by the
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of both complainants and respondents. Once a complaint is issued,
neither the Department nor the Commission takes an active role
on behalf of either party in contested matters.
In addition to providing for a time period within which a
charge must be filed, the Act also specifies a limitations period for
the filing of the complaint by the Department. The Act provides
that the complaint must be filed within 300 days from the date on
which the charge was filed.10 ' The effect of this same limitations
period under the Fair Employment Practices Act has been the subject of much litigation.10 8
Thereafter, in a trilogy of cases, the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the approach taken in Moss-American and held that the
limitations period contained in the Fair Employment Practices Act
was mandatory. The first case to apply this mandatory construction was Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Plan Commission v. Fair Employment Practices Commission.104 Reversing the
lower court, 0 5 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the time period within which to file a complaint under the FEPA was in the
nature of a statute of limitations.10 6 Therefore, a complaint that is
filed beyond the specified statutory period is time-barred. The
Illinois Supreme Court in Board of Dist. 508 v. Human Rights Comm'n., 88 Ill. 2d
22, 429 N.E.2d 1207 (1981).
102. Section 7-102(G) of the Act provides:
(G) Time Limit. When a charge of a civil rights violation has been
properly filed, the Department, within 300 days thereof or within any
extension of that period agreed to in writing by all parties, shall either
issue and file a complaint in the matter and form set forth in this Section
or shall order that no complaint be issued. Any such order shall be duly
served upon both the complainant and the respondent.
103. See, e.g., Moss-American, Inc. v. Fair Employent Practices Comm'n, 22
Ill. App. 3d 248, 317 N.E.2d 343 (1974). In Moss-American, the FEPC initially
found in favor of the complainant. On judicial review, the circuit court ruled that
the FEPC lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was not filed within the then
180-day filing period. ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 48, § 858(c) (1967). The FEPC appealed
and the Fifth District reversed, holding that the period within which the complaint was to be filed was not a jurisdictional requirement. The court reasoned
that nothing in the Fair Employment Practices Act suggests that the rights of a
complaining party can be forfeited by the agency's failure to take action. The
period within which the complaint was to be filed was directory in nature and not
mandatory, according to the court. 22 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 317 N.E.2d at 348.
104. 71 Ill. 2d 61, 373 N.E.2d 1307 (1978).
105. 45 Il. App. 3d 116, 359 N.E.2d 174 (1976).
106. 71 Ill. 2d at 68-69, 373 N.E.2d at 1310. The court also stated that being
a statute of limitations, its application is subject to waiver and estoppel. Id.
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FEPC was thus without jurisdiction to adjudicate cases in such instances. The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished the Moss-American decision based upon the fact the complaint there was issued
only a few days beyond the time period and the action involved the
same employer throughout the entire proceeding. In reaching its
decision, the Springfield-Sangamon court applied the following
balancing approach:
Although an aggrieved individual who has suffered discrimination should not be deprived of the benefits of the Act because
of administrative failures, we must also consider that those
charged under the Act have the right to a determination of the
validity of the charge within the time limitations of the statute.
In the event of a finding against a respondent the impact of the
administrative order may be severe. In this case, the order was
entered in 1973, almost 5 years after the alleged unfair employment practice. This period of time would have been substantially
shortened and the amount of money the respondents would have
been required to pay Smith as accrued salary and interest would
have been considerably less if Smith and the FEPC had complied
with the statute. The respondents have the right to expect that
the impact of such administrative orders will 1be7 minimized by
compliance with the statutory time limitations.
Shortly thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court in Board of
Governors of State Colleges & Universities v. Fair Employment
Practices Commission0 " declared- that its earlier decision in
Springfield-Sangamonwas "clear and unequivocal." The time period within which a complaint is to be filed was intended by the
legislature to be a mandatory time period. Absent a stipulation by
the parties extending that time period, the filing of the complaint
subsequent to the limitations period would be unauthorized. 10 9 The
court recognized that it had made reference to waiver and estoppel
as a defense to an untimely filing in the Springfield-Sangamonde107. Id. at 73, 373 N.E.2d at 1312. The supreme court's reasoning in Spring-

field-Sangamon in an attempt to distinguish the decision in Moss-American is
unclear. While the court declined to overrule Moss-American, it distinguished
that decision due to the short period of time that had elapsed beyond the
statutory filing period. However, if the period in which a complaint was to be filed
was akin to a statute of limitations as the supreme court held in SpringfieldSangamon, it should not matter if the complaint was filed one day late or 100
days late. It is still beyond the limitations period provided in the Act.
108. 78 Ill. 2d 143, 399 N.E.2d 590 (1979).
109. Id. at 149, 399 N.E.2d at 593.
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cision, 110 but stated that neither that case nor Board of Governors

dealt with the question of whether conduct other than a written
agreement would be sufficient to extend the time period. Thus, the
Board of Governors decision did not decide the question of
whether waiver and estoppel could apply in such cases, but left the
issue open.
The third opinion in this trilogy was Zimmerman Brush Co. v.
Fair Employment Practices Commission."' As discussed previously, this case dealt not with the time period within which a complaint had to be filed, but the time period within which a factfinding conference had to take place. The court, relying on its earlier decisions in Springfield-Sangamon and Board of Governors,
once again found the time period to be mandatory. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the agency's failure to hold this fact-finding conference mandated the dismissal of the complainant's case.
110. Id. See Springfield-Sangamon,71111. 2d at 69, 373 N.E.2d at 1310. As a
result of these two decisions, approximately 3,000 cases pending before the Fair
Employment Practices Commission were either dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
or subject to dismissal. In an attempt to save these cases, the FEPA was amended
to provide a new cause of action for persons whose claims were barred because of
the untimely filing of their complaints. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 858.01a
(1979), repealed by Human Rights Act, P.A. 81-1216, § 11-101, effective July 1,
1980. The substance of that section was included in the Human Rights Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 9-102(B)(1) (1981). That section provided:
(B) Special Cases. (1) In the case of any charge of an unfair employment
practice which was properly filed with the Fair Employment Practices
Commission prior to March 30, 1978, which had not been settled or adjusted by conference and conciliation and which within 180 days thereafter had not been the subject of a complaint issued by the Fair Employment Practices Commission or an order that no complaint be issued, the
person filing the charge may seek appropriate injunctive or other relief
by filing an action in the circuit court of the county where the alleged
unfair employment practice occurred, and if the person prevails in such
action the court may award such person costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees. The Fair Employment Practice Commission shall notify all such
persons by registered mail of their right to seek such relief and any such
action must be initiated in the circuit court within 2 years of the receipt
of such notice, notwithstanding any other statute of limitations imposed
on such actions. Any person not so notified before the effective date of
this Act shall be notified in accordance with this section by the
Department.
This attempt did not meet with any success. The Illinois Supreme Court in Wilson v. All-Steel, Inc., held that this section of the Act constituted prohibited special legislation and violated a respondent's due process rights by attempting to
revise a previously barred cause of action. 87 Ill. 2d 28, 428 N.E.2d 289 (1981).
111. 82 Ill. 2d 99, 411 N.E.2d 277 (1980).
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The Zimmerman Brush opinion specifically addressed the question
of whether the employer waived his right to have the matter dismissed. After examining the facts, the court held that there was no
basis for waiver and estoppel."'
One of the first major issues facing the Commission at its conception in 1980 was the effect and application of Springfield-Sangamon and Board of Governors. In two of its decisions, Land and
Clark Maple Chevrolet"' and Jones and Mama Batt's Restau14
the Commission reversed dismissals of complaints, holding
rant,"
that waiver and estoppel were viable defenses against motions to
dismiss complaints as being untimely filed. These Commission decisions relied upon the language contained in Springfield-Sangamon" 5 and the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court in Zimmerman
Brush addressed the waiver question in its decision. The Commission also placed its reliance on an appellate court opinion which
construed these decisions as allowing the application of the waiver
and estoppel doctrines."'
The Commission has been cautious in its application of the
waiver and estoppel doctrines and has refused to apply these doctrines in a number of cases.117 Whether the doctrines of waiver or
estoppel will be applied by the Commission in such instances will
depend upon the facts in each particular case. 1 8 The burden of
proving the existence of waiver or estoppel rests with the asserting
party to prove each element of the defense by a preponderance of
the evidence." 9
The importance of the Commission's waiver and estoppel decisions have been considerably diminished by the United States Supreme Court ruling in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.'2 0 and the
112. Id. at 106-07, 411 N.E.2d at 282. The Zimmerman Brush decision was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. There the matter was reversed and
remanded. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).

113. 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 17 (1981).
114. 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 73 (1981).

115. 71 Ill. 2d at 68-69, 373 N.E.2d at 1310.

116. See Louise v. Department of Labor, 90 11. App. 3d 410, 413 N.E.2d 113
(1980).
117. E.g., Carlson and Warner Elec. Brake, 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 54 (1981); Jackson and City of DuQuoin, 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 67 (1981); Norris and A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 202 (1981).
118. Land and Clark Maple Chevrolet, 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 17, 24 (1981).
119. Carlson and Warner Elec. Brake, 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 54, 59 (1981). See also
Pantle v. Industrial Comm'n, 61 Ill. 2d 365, 369, 335 N.E.2d 491, 494 (1975).
120. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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appellate court's construction of Logan in Lott v. Governors State
University."' As previously discussed, the Logan decision dealt
with the time period within which a fact-finding conference must
be held, not the time period regarding the filing of a complaint.
However, it was clear from the Supreme Court's opinion in Logan
that a dismissal of the complainant's cause of action because the
state failed to file a complaint was just as much a violation of the
complainant's due process rights as a dismissal because of the
state's failure to hold a fact-finding conference. Therefore, the appellate court in Lott applied the Logan doctrine to cases where the
complaint was not filed within the statutory time period."
Once the complaint is filed with the Commission, it is served
upon all of the parties. Each respondent must file an answer or a
motion to dismiss within thirty days from the receipt of the complaint." If the motion to dismiss is denied, the respondent is
given an additional fifteen days to file an answer."14 Any allegation
of the complaint which is not denied is deemed admitted unless
the respondent pleads insufficient knowledge or information to
form a belief as to the allegations."

Similarly, failure to file an

answer within the requisite time period also constitutes an admission of the allegations contained in the complaint."' Any new matter contained in the answer is considered denied without the necessity of a reply unless the complainant is ordered to file a reply by
the administrative law judge assigned to the case." 7
Pleadings may be amended at any time prior to the issuance
of the administrative law judge's decision.' " A complaint can be
121. 106 Ill. App. 3d 851, 436 N.E.2d 569 (1982).
122. The court stated:
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, the Court found that

"Logan is entitled to have the Commission [FEPC] consider the merits

of his charge, based on the substantiality of the available evidence,
before deciding whether to terminate his claim." [455 U.S. at 432.] The

same minimum process is due the plaintiff here. Lott is entitled to have

the Department of Human Rights and the Human Rights Commission
(the successors of the FEPC) consider the merits of his discrimination
charge in accordance with the procedures set out in articles 7 and 8 of

the IHRA.

106 Il App. 3d at 855, 436 N.E.2d at 572.
123. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-106(D)(1) (1981).
124. Id. § 8-106(D)(2).
125. Id. § 8-106(D)(3).
126. Id. § 8-106(D)(4).
127. Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 6.4(E).
128. Id. § 6.5(a).
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amended to add an additional respondent only if such party is the
successor or assignee of an original respondent.'29 In any other instance a complaint cannot be amended to add a new respondent.
Where a party dies while the case is pending, the party's legal representative may be substituted.'
The Commission's rules provide for most standard modes of
discovery.' These include interrogatories, requests for production
of documents, requests to admit facts, and depositions. However, a
desposition may be taken as a matter of right only when the deponent resides outside of the state or is unable to attend the hearing
or investigation.1 3 2 In all other instances, depositions can be taken
only when leave is granted by the administrative law judge assigned to the case. The control and timing of discovery is also left
to the discretion of the administrative law judge, " 8 with the burden to show an abuse of discretion on the party seeking relief from
a discovery order or sanction."' The administrative law judges
maintain and enforce discovery cut-off dates. The Commission also
has the authority to issue subpoenas to require the attendance of
witnesses at the hearing. "'
Prior to the public hearing, the parties are required to prepare
a prehearing memorandum for the purpose of narrowing the issues
and stipulating as to facts and documents. " 6 The Commission can
also convene a prehearing conference. Failure to prepare a prehearing memorandum or appear at a prehearing conference can result
37
in dismissal or default.1

III. PROCEDURE AT HEARING
Hearings under the Human Rights Act are held before hearing
officers (administrative law judges) who are full time employees of
the Commission. The hearing is to be held not less than thirty nor
more than ninety days after the issuance of the complaint, but this
129. Id. § 6.6(a).
130. Id. § 6.6(b).

131. Id. § 7.2.
132. Id. § 7.2(a)(iii).
133. Mathews and Chicago Export Packing, 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 147, 151 n. 5

(1982). See also Elmore v. Blume, 31 Ill. App. 3d 643, 334 N.E.2d 431 (1975).
134. Chambers and Ford Motor Co., 3 Il. HRC Rep. 89 (1982).
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-104(A)(1), (2) (1981).
136. Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 7.1(a).
137. Id. § 7.1(b). See also Huster and Amax Zinc Co., 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 90
(1981).
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date can be extended for good cause.138 Also by statute, the hearing
is to be held within 100 miles of the place where the alleged civil
rights violation took place. 8 9
The complainant is not assisted or represented by the Department at the hearing. No Commission or Department employee is
allowed to testify at a public hearing except upon order of the administrative law judge assigned to the case." 0 An order allowing
such testimony will be granted only upon a showing that the testimony is admissible and cannot be obtained through .any other
means."' All testimony at the hearing is given under oath and is
subject to the rules of evidence. 4 2 A record of the proceedings is
kept and is available for inspection at the Chicago office of the
Commission. Failure to appear at the hearing can result in dismissal or default or the entry of an order requiring payment of attor-3
ney's fees and reasonable expenses incurred by any other party."
In order to prevail in an action brought under the Human
Rights Act, the complainant must prove a case of discrimination
by a preponderance of the evidence." 4 The allocation as to burden
of proof in discrimination cases that is set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green'" has
147
0
been adopted by both the Commission" and the Illinois courts
as the method of proving disparate treatment discrimination.
Under the McDonnell Douglas formulation, the complainant carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrim138. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-106(B) (1981).

139. Id.
140. Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 7.5(b)(iii).
141. Id.
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-106(E)(2), (3) (1981). A witness can also be
called as an adverse witness in the same manner as provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1102 (1981)(effective July 1, 1982).
143. Allen and Viracon, Inc., 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 63 (1981) (dismissal only);
Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 7.5(e).
144. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-106(F)(1) (1981). Failure to meet this standard results in a finding for the respondent and dismissal of the complaint. See
Smiley and Sundstrand Corp., 3 II. HRC Rep. 137 (1982); Taylor and Illinois
Cent. Gulf R.R., 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 161 (1981).
145. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
146. See Clifton and Burdnam City Hosp., 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 1 (1982); Dawson
and City of Quincy, 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 92 (1982); Golden and Clark Oil Ref. Corp., 2
Ill. HRC Rep. 95 (1981).
147. See Unger v. Sirena Div. of Consol. Foods Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 580, 377
N.E.2d 266 (1974); A.P. Green Serv. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 19 II.
App. 3d 875, 312 N.E.2d 314 (1974).
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ination. The complainant must show: (i) that he or she is a member of the protected category; (ii) that the complainant applied for
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his or her qualifications, the complainant was rejected; and (iv) that after the rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons with complainant's qualifications.14 Although McDonnell Douglas dealt with a black male who was rejected for a
job, this framework has been applied to all protected classifications
and factual patterns.
Once the complainant has established a prima facie case of
discrimination, the respondent must then articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken.149 The nature of the
respondent's evidentiary burden was clarified by the Supreme
Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.50
Under Burdine, the defendant's burden is one of production, not
persuasion. Since the ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all
times with the plaintiff, the defendant need only clearly explain
the reasons for his actions. Once this is done, the plaintiff must
show that the explanation given was pretext. 51
Prior to Burdine, some courts in Illinois seemed to impose an
affirmative burden of proof upon the defendant in discrimination
cases, while others did not. 52 Subsequent to Burdine, a number of
recommended orders and decisions urged the Commission to place
148. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. For a general discussion of this
issue, see Friedman, The Burger Court and the PrimaFacie Case in Employment
DiscriminationLitigation: A Critique,65 CoRNE:LL L. REv. 1 (1979); Mendez, Presumptions of DiscriminatoryMotive in Title VII DisparateTreatment Cases, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1129 (1980); Nelson & Ward, Burdens of Proof Under Employment
DiscriminationLegislation,6 J. COLL. & U.L. 301 (1980); Note, Civil Rights: Defendant's Burden of Proof in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 143 (1981).
149. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
150. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
151. Id. at 253. See also Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
152. Compare A.P. Green Services Div. v. Fair Employment Practices
Comm'n, 19 Ill. App. 3d 875, 312 N.E.2d 314 (1974) and Unger v. Sirena Div. of
Consol. Foods, 60 II. App. 3d 840, 377 N.E.2d 266 (1978) (where the court imposed upon the defendant a burden of proving a valid reason for the adverse action) with Board of Educ., Downers Grove School Dist. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 79 Il1. App. 3d 446, 398 N.E.2d 619 (1978) (where the court
required the defendant to state only a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
action taken).
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an affirmative burden of proof upon the respondent. The Commission declined to deviate from the Burdine standard finding that it
is merely a clarification of McDonnell Douglas."3 Thus, in cases
before the Commission involving disparate treatment, the burden
remains at all times upon the complainant. The respondent need
articulate only a legitimate reason for the action taken.""
At the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative law judge
usually requires the parties to submit post-hearing memoranda
containing proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and any
arguments the parties wish to make. After the receipt of these
memoranda and a review of the transcript of proceedings, the administrative law judge prepares and files a written recommended
order and decision with the Commission. The recommended order
and decision is not binding upon the Commission.' The Commission can also entertain interlocutory appeals from rulings of the
administrative law judge, but only when the administrative law
judge certifies that the issue presented is of such importance as to
require a Commission decision prior to the completion of the
case. 15" The Commission will not entertain an interlocutory appeal
57
filed by a party.1

IV.

COMMISSION REVIEW

After a recommended order and decision is filed, any party
may appeal all or any portion of that recommended order by filing
written exceptions with the Commission within thirty days from
the receipt of the recommended order. " Thereafter, any party
may file a response to the exceptions within twenty-one days from
153. Schellhardt and Waterloo Community School Dist., 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 61
(1981); Mathews and Chicago Export Packing, 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 147 (1982).
154. This is not to say that any articulation made by the respondent is acceptable. The respondent must produce admissible evidence that would allow the
administrative law judge to conclude that the respondent's decision was not motivated by discrimination. For example, the case of Dawson and City of Quincy
held that assertions made in an opening statement do not constitute an articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken. 3 Ill. HRC
Rep. 92, 101 (1982).
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-107(E)(1) (1981).

156. Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 7.4. To date,
the Commission has heard only one interlocutory appeal. See Barrett and Equitable Life Assurance Society, 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 27 (1981).
157. Chambers and Ford Motor Co., 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 89 (1982).
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-107(A) (1981).
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their receipt.1 59 Extensions of these time periods can be obtained
by filing a written motion with the Commission.'" When filing exceptions or responses, any party can request oral argument before
the Commission panel assigned to the case. 6 ' It is strongly suggested that parties utilize their right to oral argument. After taking
part in most of the oral arguments held before the Commission, it
is the author's belief that oral argument can make a positive difference in the outcome of a case.
Each recommended order and decision is reviewed by a threemember Commission panel whether exceptions have been filed or
not. A case is not considered final until a written order and decision is filed by the Commission panel.' After a review of the administrative record and any oral argument, the Commission panel
can either affirm, reverse or modify the recommended order and
decision, either in whole or in part.'"5 Even though exceptions are

not filed, the Commission panel can still reverse or modify a recommended order.
The Act requires the Commission to adopt the findings of fact
contained in the recommended order and decision unless they are
found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.'" In
applying this standard, the Commission has adopted the findings
of fact contained in the great majority of recommended orders.'6 5
On occasion, however, the Commission, upon review of the record,
has reversed the factual determinations of the administrative law
judge, finding them to be against the manifest weight of the evi159. Id. § 8-107(B).
160. Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 8.4.
161. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-107(c) (1981).

162. Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 8.1.
163. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-107(E)(1) (1981). In its first year of operation,
July 1, 1980, through June 30, 1981, the Commission reviewed 43 recommended

orders and decisions. Thirty-nine of these recommended orders were affirmed and
four were reversed. Several of the affirmed decisions were modified in one manner
or another. See ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS & ILL. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORTS (1981).
164. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-107(E)(2) (1981).

165. See, e.g., Darfler and City of Aurora, 4 Ill. HRC Rep. 42 (1982); Amer-

son and Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co., 4 II. HRC Rep. 123 (1982); Walsh and Village
of Oak Lawn, 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 130 (1982); Hay and Canton State Bank, 1 II. HRC
Rep. 128 (1981); Walker and Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 41 (1981);
Prince and Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508, 1 Ill. HRC

Rep. 1 (1980), aff'd, Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508 v.
Human Rights Comm'n, 88 Ill. 2d 22, 429 N.E.2d 1207 (1981).
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dence.'" Like reviewing courts, 167 the Commission does not apply

a manifest weight standard of review to any conclusions or determinations of law that are contained in a recommended order.'
The Commission can also enter an order remanding the case
to the administrative law judge either for the purpose of hearing
additional evidence or reconsidering the evidence.' 69 Requests for
remand are generally viewed with disfavor and have in most instances been denied. In order to be granted a remandment, the
moving party must show each of the following: (a) the motion was
timely filed; (b) the motion sets forth a detailed statement showing
the evidence to be presented and its relevance; (c) the motion sets
forth valid reasons why the evidence was not presented at the
hearing; and (d) substantial justice requires that the motion be
granted.17 0 On occasion, the Commission has remanded cases on its
own motion.
Upon entry of the Commission's order and decision, any party
may petition for rehearing before the entire Commission. An application for rehearing must be filed within thirty days after the
Commission's order.' Petitions for rehearing have been granted
166. See, e.g., Schellhardt and Waterloo Community School Dist. No. 5, 2 Ill.
HRC Rep. 61 (1981); Onkvisit and Board of Regents, 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 172 (1981);
Zabroski and United States Steel Corp., 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 75 (1981).
167. See, e.g., Illinois-Indiana Cable T.V. Ass'n v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 205, 302 N.E.2d 334 (1973); National Talent Assocs. v. Holland, 76 Ill. App. 3d 556, 395 N.E.2d 142 (1979); Nestle Co. v. Johnson, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 17, 385 N.E.2d 793 (1979).
168. For example, the Commission has reversed recommended orders and decisions in the following instances: (1) where it was concluded that the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel did not apply under the Act, Land and Clark Maple Chevrolet Co.,. 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 17 (1981); Jones and Mama Batt's Restaurant, 1 Ill. HRC
Rep. 73 (1981); (2) where the recommended order and decision granted relief on a
class-wide basis even though the individual complainant's claim was dismissed,
DeCarlo and City of Chicago, 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 82 (1981); (3) where it was concluded that the complainant was a victim of retaliation, Hendricks and City of
Galesburg, 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 103 (1981); (4) where it was concluded that respondent failed to establish a bona fide occupational qualification, Norwood and Dale
Maintenance System, Inc., 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 114 (1981); (5) where it was concluded
that the complainant was a victim of national origin discrimination, Onkvisit and
Board of Regents, 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 172 (1981); (6) where it was concluded that the
respondent engaged in unequal pay practices, Campea and Bremen School Dist., 3
Ill. HRC Rep. 51 (1982).
169. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-107(D)(1) (1981).
170. Golden and Clark Oil Ref. Corp., 2 Ill. HRC Rep. 95 (1981); Rules and
Regulations of the Human Rights Commission § 9.1.
171. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-107(F)(1) (1981).
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only in those cases where significant legal issues before the Commission are raised or where panels of the Commission have reached
conflicting decisions. 17 2 Unless either of these criteria is met, motions for rehearing before the full Commission are generally denied. The Commission may also modify or set aside its order, either in whole or in part, at any time 73prior to a final order of a court
1
in a proceeding for judicial review.
Given the fact that the decision of the administrative law
judge is only a recommendation, Commission review is of extreme
importance to litigants under the Act. The decisions made under
the Act are, in essence, the decisions of the Commission. The determinations of the administrative law judges are not routinely approved, but are carefully scrutinized by the Commission on review.
Thus, the review procedure contained in section 8-107 of the Act
should be utilized to its utmost.
V.

REMEDIES

Once it has been determined by the Commission that a complainant has prevailed, the Commission can impose numerous remedies, either separately or in any combination. If liability is established, the Commission can order the respondent to: cease and
desist from committing such unlawful acts of discrimination;' 74 pay
actual monetary damages to the aggrieved party;1 75 reinstate, hire,
promote or upgrade the complainant or provide for fringe benefits
which have been denied; 17' admit or restore membership to any
programs or labor organizations;17 7 admit the complainant to any
public accommodations previously denied;1 7 8 extend or restore full
and equal enjoyment of any goods, services, privileges or accommodations; 179 pay all or a portion of complainant's attorney's fees or
172. To date, rehearing before the full Commission has been granted only in
the following cases: DeCarlo and City of Chicago, 1 IM. HRC Rep. 82 (1981);
Campea and Bremen School Dist., 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 51 (1982); Ryker and Yellow
Freight System, 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 21 (1982); Borgman and Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation, 4 Ill. HRC Rep. 184 (1982).
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-107(G)(1) (1981).
174. Id. § 8-108(A).
175. Id. § 8-108(B).
176. Id. § 8-108(C).
177. Id. § 8-108(D).
178. Id. § 8-108(E).
179. Id. § 8-108(F).
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costs; 180 report as to compliance with the Commission's order;1 81
and post notices in a conspicuous place as to requirements for
compliance. 182 The Act also allows the Commission to take any
other action as is necessary to make the complainant whole." 8 It
has been held, however, that the imposition of any other remedies
not contained in the Act would be considered beyond the scope of
the Commission's power. 84 The Act also provides for debarment of
public contractors with the State of Illinois; suspension or revocation of state licenses; and disciplinary proceedings against public
officials who are deemed responsible for any civil rights violations
under the Act.'
Perhaps the biggest problem facing the Commission in the
area of remedies has been the question of attorney's fees. Both the
complainant and the respondent can be awarded attorney's fees
under the Act, but in different circumstances.'" The Commission
has held that attorney's fees cannot be awarded to a respondent
merely because a charge is dismissed by the Department for lack of
substantial evidence. To do so would have a chilling effect upon a
complainant's right to file a charge under the Act. 87 The Act thus
sets a much higher standard upon the respondent in obtaining an
award of attorney's fees.
The problems confronting the Commission regarding the issue
of attorney's fees usually arise when the complainant prevails.
Given the remedial nature of the Human Rights Act, attorneys
should be compensated for the work they perform on behalf of a
180. Id. § 8-108(G).
181. Id. § 8-108(H).

182. Id. § 8-108(1).

183. Id. § 8-108(A).
184. See City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d
108, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976). At one time the Fair Employment Practices Act did
not provide for attorney's fees.
185. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-109 (1981). See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n,
86 Ill. 2d 60, 426 N.E.2d 877 (1981); S.N. Nielsen Co. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of
Chicago, 81 Ill. 2d 290, 410 N.E.2d 40 (1980).
186. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-108(G) ("Pay to the complainant all
or a portion of the costs of maintaining the action, including reasonable attorney
fees and expert witness fees.") with ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-106(F)(5) ("A recommended order dismissing a complaint may include an award of reasonable at-

torneys fees in favor of the respondent if the hearing officer concludes that the
complaint was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless or that the complainant continued to litigate after it became clearly so.").
187. Townsend and Carle Found. Hosp., 1 Ill. HRC Rep. 157 (1981).
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prevailing complainant. However, the Commission has held that
the purpose of the attorney's fees provision is not to make attorneys rich. 88 The Commission thus scrutinizes attorney's fee requests and has in some instances reduced the amount of fees requested, 8 9 denied attorney's fees altogether' 9° or ordered an
evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of fees to be
awarded. 19' In determining whether to award a prevailing complainant all or a portion of his attorney's fees, the Commission initially adopted the guidelines set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 92 and Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works.193
Under these cases, the factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of an attorney's fee request include the following:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of
the question; (3) the skill necessary to perform the legal services;
(4) the fee customarily charged for similar legal services in the locality; (5) the preclusion of other employment due to the acceptance of the case; (6) the time limitations imposed; (7) whether the
fee is fixed or contingent; (8) the experience, reputation and ability
of the attorneys; and (9) the amount involved and the results
obtained.'
Faced with an increasing number of cases involving disputes
over attorney's fees, it became apparent to the Commission that
the standards set forth in Waters and Johnson and adopted by the
Commission needed to be expanded. Therefore, in Clark and
Champaign National Bank,' the Commission formulated additional standards that will. be utilized in making attorney's fee
awards. In its Clark decision the Commission addressed the follow188. Walsh and Village of Oak Lawn, 3 Ill. HRC Rep. 130 (1982). See also
Copeland v. Marshall, 54 F.2d 244, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
189. Walsh, 3 Ill. HRC Rep. at 130.
190. Clark and The Champaign Nat'l Bank, 4 Ill. HRC Rep. 193 (1982); Mathews and Chicago Export Packing, 5 Ill. HRC Rep. 1 (1982).
191. Schoneberg and Grundy County Special Educ. Coop., Charge No. 1976
CN 0876 (Ill. HRC 1981).
192. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19, (5th Cir. 1974).
193. 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974).
194. The Waters and Johnson guidelines were utilized by the Commission in
both Schoneberg and Walsh.
195. 4 Ill. HRC Rep. 193 (1982). Much of what is contained in the Commission's decision in Clark is adopted from the following federal decisions: National
Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980); and Brown v.
Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1980).
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ing four questions:
(A) What type of factual showing is necessary to establish

what the attorney's requested hourly rate will be?
(B) What type of factual showing is necessary to establish

the number of hours reasonably expended in a case before the
Commission?

(C) What factors should be considered in adjusting the fee

award?
(D) When should the Commission conduct an evidentiary
hearing on a request for attorney's fees? 1"

The burden of sustaining an award for fees is on the movant.
The starting point in any fee request is to determine whether the
attorney's billing practice and rate has been adequately substantiated.19 An attorney requesting fees must provide specific evidence
of the prevailing community rate for the type of work for which he
seeks an award. For example, affidavits reciting the precise fees
that attorneys with similar qualifications have received from feepaying clients in comparable cases can provide prevailing community rate information. Attorneys requesting fees under the Human
Rights Act should thus submit specific evidence of their actual billing practice during the relevant time period. This information will
provide important substantiating evidence of the prevailing community rate for such legal services. 198
Once the hourly billing rate is established, the number of
hours expended on the case is examined. An applicant for attorney's fees is entitled only to an award for time reasonably expended. Fees cannot be awarded for nonproductive time. A fee application should thus indicate whether nonproductive time or time
expended on unsuccessful claims was excluded; if such time items
were excluded, the nature of the work and the number of hours
involved should be specified. 199 Fee requests that are excessive and
inflated will not be approved by the Commission. When such requests are totally unreasonable or are excessive, they are subject to
complete denial. 00
196. Clark, 4 Ill. HRC Rep. at 198.
197. Id. See also In re Walfeld Co., 345 F.2d 676 (2nd Cir. 1965).
198. Clark, 4 Ill. HRC Rep. at 199. See also City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448 (2nd Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973).
199. Clark, 4 Ill. HRC Rep. at 200; See also National Ass'n of Concerned
Veterans, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
200. Clark, 4 Ill. HRC Rep. at 201. See also Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057
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After the billing rate and number of reasonable hours expended have been established, the Commission then takes into
consideration the following factors: (a) the extent that the party
has prevailed;"' (b) the nature of the controversy; (c) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (d) the difficulty of the subject
matter; 02 (e) the skill and standing in the legal community; and (f)
the adequacy or inadequacy of the representation. 0 3
As noted above, the Commission can order an evidentiary
hearing in cases involving disputed attorney's fees claims. Many
disputes can be resolved without the necessity of a hearing if the
fee request is properly documented. Procedural fairness requires
that a hearing be held where, in the Commission's view, material
issues of fact exist that may substantially affect the size of a fee
(7th Cir. 1980). In Clark, the complainant prevailed in only one of two issues
before the Commission. The damages that the complainant was entitled to were
minimal. Yet, complainant's attorneys were seeking a fee award of over $81,000.00
In another case before the Commission, a fee request in the amount of $48,825.00
was rejected as being improperly documented and, it was held there was no justification for the use of a multiplier. Amerson and Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co., 5 Ill.
HRC Rep 167 (1982).
201. For instance, if the complainant contends that he was denied a promotion for discriminatory reasons and was subsequently retaliated against because
he filed a charge and he does not prevail on both of these contentions, he cannot
recover attorney's fees for the hours expended on the unsuccessful claim. See
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982); Busche v. Burkee, 649
F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.
1981); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974); Fiorito v.
Jones, 72 Ill. 2d 73, 377 N.E.2d 1019 (1978); In re Thorton, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1078,
412 N.E.2d 1336 (1980).
202. See Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d at 1059. Included in this portion of the
analysis would be the time spent on purely legal matters, as opposed to nonlegal
matters. Travel time or time spent organizing files or conferring with a client on
the status of the case may be worth less than time spent on trial or in the performance of legal functions. See Corpus v. Estelle, 607 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979);
Entertainment Concepts III, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 514 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Norwood v. Harrison, 410 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
203. An adjustment based on this factor is appropriate only if the legal representation was unusually good or bad, taking into account the level of skill normally expected of an attorney commanding the hourly rate at which he or she
bills. An adjustment for the quality of representation should not be routinely
awarded, but awarded only in exceptional circumstances. The burden is once
again upon the applicant specifically to request such an adjustment and show why
it is warranted. Merely citing other cases where adjustments have been made or
where a multiplier factor has been used is insufficient to support an increase in
the attorney's fees award. Clark, 4 Ill. HRC Rep. at 199-200.
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award.' 04 Most importantly, many disputes involving attorney's
fees requests before the Commission can be avoided if the parties
involved are fair and reasonable.
VI.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

When any order entered by the Commission has been violated,
the Commission can order the Department to commence an action
in the appropriate circuit court to compel compliance with the order.'0 5 The court may find the violator in civil contempt. 0 6 Fortunately, the Commission has not as yet had to resort to such measures to enforce its orders.
Final decisions of the Human Rights Commission are reviewable by the circuit courts under article III of the Code of Civil Procedure. 0 7 Such proceedings are commenced in the circuit court in
the county where the alleged civil rights violation was committed.0 8 Under the Act, the Commission's findings of fact are to be
affirmed unless the court determines that such findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 2 0 9 At one time, however, there was a split in opinion as to what standard of review
would be applied in employment discrimination cases under Illinois law. Some reviewing courts used a preponderance of the evidence standard of review, 10 while other courts employed a manifest weight standard of review.'21 The Illinois Supreme Court
solved this dilemma in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment
204. Id. at 200. See also Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1233 (8th Cir.
1981); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978).
205. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-111(B)(1) (1981).
206. Id. § 8-111(B)(4).

207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 3-101 (1981) (effective July 1, 1982) (formerly
the Administrative Review Act, ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1975)).
208. Id. ch. 68, § 8-111(C) (1981).
209. Id. ch. 68, § 8-111(A)(2) (1981). For an examination of the manifest
weight standard of review, see Ryan v. Verbic, 97 Ill. App. 3d 739, 423 N.E.2d 534
(1981); Lavin v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 18 Ill. App. 3d 982, 310 N.E.2d 858 (1974);
Zinser v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 28 Ill. App. 2d 435, 172 N.E.2d
33 (1961).
210. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fair Employment Practices
Comm'n, 49 Ill. App. 3d 796, 365 N.E.2d 535 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Fair
Employment Practices Comm'n, 38 Ill. App. 3d 967, 349 N.E.2d 553 (1976); Chicago Transit Authority v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 103 Ill. App. 2d
329, 243 N.E.2d 638 (1968).
211. See, e.g., A.P. Green Serv. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 19 Ill.
App. 3d 875, 312 N.E.2d 314 (1974).
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Practices Commission by holding that reviewing courts are not to
reweigh the evidence but are to apply the manifest weight standard of review to decisions of the Commission.2 "
The Human Rights Act prohibits the maintenance of any
other action in the Illinois courts to redress alleged civil rights violations other than under the Act, except where otherwise provided
by law. 1 8 Furthermore, the Human Rights Act has been held to
preempt local governments from enforcing civil rights legislation
which is broader in scope than the state statute. 2 4' Although a general tort action would no doubt be barred, 21 6 a private action to
redress certain types of discrimination may be maintained under
the Illinois Constitution. 1 6
VII.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Illinois Human Rights Act is to eradicate
unlawful discrimination as well as to protect persons in this state
from unfounded charges of discrimination. The functions of the
Department of Human Rights and the Human Rights Commission
are primarily limited to investigatory and adjudicatory roles respectively. The formulation of law under the Human Rights Act
will to a great degree depend upon the individuals practicing
before the Department and Commission. To that extent, the legal
community's familiarity with the statutory and administrative procedures established under the Act is a necessity.
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216. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 17-19. Such private actions were allowed in Melvin
v. City of West Frankfort, 93 Ill. App. 3d 425, 417 N.E.2d 250 (1981) (allegation of

handicap discrimination) and Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 60 Ill. App. 3d
616, 377 N.E.2d 242 (1978) (allegation of sex discrimination). Of course, an ag-

grieved party can maintain an action also under any federal law such as Title VII.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. The party can maintain this federal action concurrently or after final disposition of his state claim. See Unger v. Consolidated
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